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Factionalism in Political Parties:  
An Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies 
 
 
Abstract 
Factionalism can affect the stability and institutionalization of parties and party systems 
and it can impact on the efficiency and legitimacy of political parties and political systems 
as a whole. Nevertheless, factionalism has only received scant attention in the comparative 
literature on political parties. As this paper shows, there is no dearth of conceptual ap-
proaches and hypotheses which can readily be used to advance the systematic analysis of 
factionalism. We survey the relevant literature and offer a comprehensive analytical 
framework to stimulate comparatively oriented and nuanced studies of the causes, charac-
teristics and consequences of intra-party groups.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Faktionalismus in politischen Parteien:  
Ein analytischer Rahmen für vergleichende Studien 
Faktionalismus kann die Stabilität und Institutionalisierung von Parteien und Parteisys-
temen beeinträchtigen und er kann sich auch auf deren Effizienz und Legitimität auswir-
ken. Dennoch hat der Faktionalismus in der vergleichenden Forschung zu politischen Par-
teien nur begrenzte Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Wie dieses Papier zeigt, gibt es indes kei-
nen Mangel an konzeptuellen Ansätzen und Hypothesen, die für die Entwicklung einer 
systematischen Analyse innerparteilicher Gruppierungen genutzt werden können. Auf 
Basis einer Gesamtbetrachtung der bisherigen Forschung entwickeln wir in diesem Paper 
einen umfassenden analytischen Rahmen, der komparative orientierte und differenzierte 
Studien der Ursachen, Charakteristika und Auswirkungen des Faktionalismus in politi-
schen Parteien ermöglicht.  
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1. Introduction 
Political parties are of central importance for the functioning of democratic systems (Lipset 
2000). It is therefore not surprising that their structures and processes, as well as the factors 
which determine or influence them, have been analyzed time and again. The resulting 
stream of research has shown a great variety of possible organizational forms that political 
parties can take – and thus also a variety of ways in which parties perform society and state-
oriented tasks. In organizational terms, parties can exhibit a hierarchical and bureaucratic 
form, they can exist as loose umbrella organizations for individual candidates or they can 
fall in between these extremes (Morgenstern 2001: 235). There is no universally valid organ-
izational form of political parties, nor one that is forced upon them by sheer necessity. There 
is also no ideal or best organizational form since today’s advantages of a given form can 
amount to disadvantages tomorrow (Panebianco 1988: 17; Wiesendahl 1998: 64; Sferza 2002: 
168, 189). Like all organizations, parties exhibit alongside their formal organizational struc-
ture informal relational systems, operating procedures, and norms which are institutional-
Köllner/Basedau: Factionalism in Political Parties 6 
ized to different degrees (Köllner 2006: chapter 2). At least in democracies and hybrid re-
gimes in the non-Western world it cannot be assumed that formal structures and rules ‘form 
the framework, binding for all concerned, in which intra-party processes take place’ 
(Poguntke 2000: 84).  
A central insight of the literature on party organization is that parties are not homogenous 
organizations which are sure of their goals and which follow some sort of unitary will. 
Rather, parties consist of coalitions of political actors who pursue their individual interests 
and goals. The coalition these actors enter are based on the exchange of political resources 
(Panebianco 1998: chapter 1). Just as politics in general can be seen as a process based on the 
conflictive and consensus-oriented relations among interdependent individuals, intra-party 
politics is characterized by conflict and consensus between interdependent groups within 
parties (Maor 1997: 147). The activities of intra-party groups, so-called factions, can not only 
influence changes in the identity, organization, and internal decision-making processes of 
parties (cf. Harmel and Tan 2003). Factions can also affect the stability of parties and party 
systems. They can influence how parties perform their societal and state-oriented tasks. Fac-
tions can thus impinge upon the legitimacy and efficiency of democratic political systems 
(see also below). 
Against this background it is surprising that the study of the dynamics and underlying fac-
tors of intra-party factions has not played much of a role in the literature on party politics. In 
spite of a new wave of research about the organization of political parties within the past 
fifteen years or so, the topic of intra-party groups has received only scant attention in com-
parative work. Factionalism gets barely mentioned in relevant text books and survey articles 
(see e.g. Duverger 1959; Ware 1996; Katz 2002). Here the discussion centers on formal party 
structures, the distribution of power within parties, intra-party politics, and the resources 
which parties possess but factions are only noted in passing, if at all. Even Sartori (1976), 
who deals in his well-known book on parties and party systems in a more in-depth manner 
with the conceptualization and analytical penetration of intra-party groups, denies them in 
contrast to political parties any functionality. However, as we will argue in this article, intra-
party groups can have important functions and consequences for the parties and political 
systems concerned. In extreme cases, factions can even be more relevant actors than the par-
ties which host them.  
Not all academic works have regarded intra-party groups as ephemeral, short-lived and 
thus unimportant and ignorable. Individual works on democratic representation through 
political parties (Graham 1993: chapter 8) and party-systems in long-existing democracies 
such as Great Britain (Maor 1997: chapter 5; Webb 2000: chapter 6), for example, have dealt 
with factions in the context of discussions of party cohesion or competition within parties. 
Köllner/Basedau: Factionalism in Political Parties 7 
Over the last ten years or so, there have also been an increasing number of rational-choice 
analyzes of the impact of electoral systems and other formal arrangements on the emergence 
and development of factionalism.1 Before we will present in the following sections our own 
analytical framework, we first explain what exactly we mean by factionalism and factions in 
political parties. 
 
 
2. Factions: Viewpoints, Structures and Functions 
We will approach the phenomenon of factionalism first from an etymological and semantic 
point of view. A fairly neutral explanation is offered by Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary 
(1996: 359) which supplies two meanings for the word ‘faction’: 
1. A group or combination acting together within and usually against the larger body 
(as in a state, political party, or church). 
2. Dissension within a group (Latin factio ‘act of making, faction’, from facere ‘to make, 
do’. 
In general terms there are two basic views with regard to factions and political parties. From 
the perspective of modernization theory factions are proto-parties or forms of party organi-
zation which are precursors to more developed ‘modern’ parties. Factions are perceived 
here as being characteristic of the early stages of the so-called modernization process in 
which individuals and groups have broken with traditional patterns of political behavior 
but the degree of political participation and institutionalization is still low (Chambers 1963; 
Huntington 1968: 412-415).2  
The vast majority of studies portray factions as groups within parties. There are, however, 
nearly as many views of such intra-party groups as there are studies. Repeatedly there have 
been attempts to approach the topic in a more systematic manner. In particular, typologies 
of factions have been developed which focus on different kinds of factional structures and 
functions. Yet there is little agreement about the characteristics which determine factions in 
a constitutive manner. Studies have also arrived at quite diverging findings about the causes 
of factionalism and its consequences for political parties, party systems, and political sys-
tems (see below).  
Before we will deal ourselves with the possible structures, consequences, and causes of fac-
tionalism in political parties, we must define factions from a political-science perspective. In 
                                                     
1  See e.g. Cox and Rosenbluth 1996, Cox et al. 2000, Morgenstern 2001. 
2  In the 18th century the terms faction and party were used synonymously. On the differentiation of 
these two terms thereafter see Müller-Rommel (1982: 10-11). 
Köllner/Basedau: Factionalism in Political Parties 8 
1931 Harold Lasswell provided one of the first such definitions in the Encyclopedia of the So-
cial Sciences:  
[T]he term faction is commonly used to designate any constituent group of a larger 
unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. The faction 
arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application and 
not on principles.3  
In his well-known study of politics in the southern states of the US, Key used a much more 
restricted definition of factions. For him a faction denoted a group of people, both voters and 
politicians, which forms at a certain point of time in support of a given candidate running 
for office (Key [1949] 1984: 16). This limited instrumental focus on factions was however not 
taken up in the subsequent literature.4 In a first explorative article on factionalism in political 
parties, Zariski used a much wider definition. For Zariski (1960: 33) a faction was synony-
mous with ‘any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense 
of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a dis-
tinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals’.  
The various definitions of factions betray different approaches to the topic which render 
generalizing conceptualizations and systematic comparative analyses more difficult. Against 
this background, one further definition is of particular interest a) because it is broad enough 
to encompass various types of intra-party groups and b) because it does not assume the ne-
cessity of certain cultural dispositions as some other definitions do. It comes from Beller and 
Belloni (1978: 419) who define factions as ‘any relatively organized group that exists within 
the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for 
power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part’ (emphasis in the original). 
From this perspective, as Maor (1997: 149) has put it succinctly, factionalism in political par-
ties can be understood as a form of conflict organization which reflects the tendency of intra-
party actors to act collectively to reach common goals. 
In drawing together the definitions of Zariski, Beller and Belloni, we use the term ‘faction’ to 
designate every intra-party grouping which 
- exists for a certain period of time, 
- possesses a minimum of organization, 
- exhibits a common group-consciousness, 
                                                     
3  Cited in Müller-Rommel (1982: 14). 
4  Key’s attempt to come to terms with the different characteristics of factions in the Deep South’s 
Democratic Party provided an important impulse for subsequent research. Key can thus be re-
garded as the spiritus rector of political-science research on factionalism (Graham 1993: 141-146; 
Grynaviski 2004).  
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- actively pursues political goals, be these policy-, personal-, or group-specific ones, 
within a party, and which thus 
- can be discerned as a bloc within the party.5 
 
 
3. Structural Characteristics of Different Types of Factions 
The above-mentioned definitions of factions do not yet tell us much about the structures and 
functions of intra-party groupings. Well-known attempts to differentiate between different 
types of intra-party groups have been presented by Rose (1964) and Hine (1982). Both see 
factions as an expression of deeply-rooted or institutionalized differentiation within parties. 
In comparison to tendencies, single-issue groups, or wings within parties, factions, to their 
minds, are characterized by a higher degree of organization, a shared identity, an a binding 
agreement on common goals. Furthermore, Hine argues that factions are disciplined groups 
with a solid organization who are conscious of their own existence and possess some stable 
personnel. According to Rose (1964: 37), tendencies are for one defined by a stable set of atti-
tudes rather than a stable group of politicians. Thus a tendency does not equal any group of 
individuals within a party. Instead, for Rose, a tendency presents a changing coalition of 
people who share certain political attitudes and who band together from time to time under 
the label of a tendency.  
Implicit to this conceptualization of factions is a sense of longevity. Thus, even a group 
which puts forward clearly visible political positions or leaders should not be called a fac-
tion if is does not exist for a certain period of time. Intra-party groups that exist only for a 
limited span of time are unlikely to develop an ‘organizational backbone’ (Pridham 1995: 
10). What in this perspective differentiates factions from other intra-party groups is their 
greater organizational strength and their durability, in other words their high degree of in-
stitutionalization.  
While Rose and Hine thus differentiate factions from other intra-party groups, Beller and 
Belloni (1978) beg to differ. The two political scientists understand ‘factions’ as an overarch-
ing category of differently structured intra-party groups. They differentiate these groups on 
the basis of their particular organizational traits. Beller and Belloni distinguish between a) 
cliques and tendencies, b) personal, client-group factions, and c) institutionalized, organiza-
tional factions.  
                                                     
5  The informal character of intra-party groupings is as a rule, but not always a trait of factions. 
Groups mentioned in party statues (e.g. youth associations) can act as factions if, but only if, they 
exhibit the other traits mentioned above (in particular the pursuance of distinct political aims).  
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What characterizes these three ideal-typical modal types is that factional cliques and tendencies 
have very little structure.6 They are either almost totally unorganized or exhibit only a very 
ephemeral organizational set up for pursuing a single issue or for fighting an electoral cam-
paign. Recruitment to such amorphous groups does usually not take place in a coordinated 
manner and leadership of the group exists, if at all, on an ad-hoc basis. Usually there are no 
hierarchical command structures. Individuals might play a prominent role in such groups 
but this role is usually based more on charisma than on clientelistic links. As a rule, such 
groups do not have offices or headquarters of their own, structured meetings, formalized 
procedures or symbols. There is also no real group identity or formal group membership to 
speak of. More often than not, such groups exist only for a short time, especially if the com-
mon interest of the group members is confined to one issue. 
Personalized factions are based on clientelism which also serves as the central mechanism for 
mobilization. Such groups are characterized by what are usually asymmetrical exchanges of 
power resources. As a rule, hierarchies and chains of command in such groups are vertical. 
Horizontal links between group members might even be discouraged, although there can be 
subgroups. When such personalized groups have a name, it often refers to the group’s 
leader who is vital to the identity of the group. In temporal terms, the existence of such 
groups is mostly limited by the political life of the respective leader. 
In contrast to the groups just mentioned, institutionalized factions exhibit a developed organ-
izational structure and a higher degree of bureaucratization. Recruitment regularly takes 
place on a non-personal and egalitarian basis. While the political ambitions of the groups’ 
leader/s are important for the cohesion of these groups, their survival and continued exis-
tence is – as a rule – not dependent on individual leaders. This often gets also reflected in the 
groups’ names or symbols. Also, membership in such groups is formalized and members 
share a common identity.7  
It has to be emphasized that the factional types just sketched are models which in reality will 
not always be found in their pure form. There are numerous groupings in political parties 
which exhibit structural characteristics pertaining to different ideal types. Moreover, 
changes leading to a growing or diminishing complexity of intra-party groups can occur in 
the course of time. Personalized factions can thus undergo a process of institutionalization, 
but they can also evolve into loosely coupled cliques. In other words, the typology presented 
                                                     
6  The following is based on Beller and Belloni (1978: 422-430). 
7  It seems logical to deduce from the different organizational make-up of factions their respective 
autonomy from the party hosting them (see Panebianco 1988: 60, 168-169). Building on this 
thought, Morgenstern (2001) has developed a continuum whose outer ends consist of, on the one 
end, highly organized and independent factions and, on the other end, centralized parties without 
any factions.  
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above must be understood as a heuristic instrument to a) reduce the complexity of the object 
at hand and b) to assist in generating hypotheses.  
Moreover it has to be pointed out that intra-party groups can exist at different levels. Thus, 
factions do not have to be confined to the central level of a party but can also exist at the 
local or regional level of the party’s organization or within the parliamentary caucus of a 
party. In a related vein, also the diffusion of factionalism can vary. It can be restricted to elite 
groups within parties (‘elite factionalism’) or it can affect a party as a whole (‘open factional-
ism’). A third pattern consists of ‘factional alliances’, i.e. factional competition which extends 
from a lower, maybe the local level of a party to increasingly higher echelons of the party’s 
hierarchy (or vice versa).8  
 
Table 1: Descriptive characteristics and functions of factions within parties  
General descriptive  
characteristics* 
Sub-characteristics Possible findings  
(illustrations) 
Factional  
Fragmentation  
• Number of factions 
• Relative size/strength of 
factions 
• Vertical depth 
• Bipolar or multipolar factionalism  
• (A-)symmetrical factionalism 
• Factionalism only at the central level 
Factional  
Institutionalization  
• Degree of organization 
• Durability 
• Cohesion 
• Tendencies (low) 
• Personalized factions (medium) 
• Institutionalized factions (high) 
Factional Polarization 
• Conflict intensity 
• Ideological distance 
• Dynamics of inter-
factional competition 
• Low to high 
• Close to vast 
• Centripetal vs. centrifugal (Do con-
flicts increase or decrease? Are there 
any splits?) 
Main function of  
factions  
• Prevailing raison d’être , 
from ‘factions of interest 
to factions of principles’ 
(Sartori/Hume)  
• Distributive: allocation of posts and 
resources among members and fol-
lowers  
• Representative: representation of ex-
ternal interests/groups (e.g. unions, re-
gions) 
• Articulative: representation and inter-
mediation of ideologies, programs, 
and political issues (abstract, concrete: 
single issue) 
* The characteristics refer to individual parties, not party systems or individual factions. 
 
                                                     
8  For details see Beller and Belloni (1978: 437-439), Hine (1982: 39-41), and Müller-Rommel (1982: 46-47). 
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We suggest to catalogue the essential characteristics of intra-party factions in a similar man-
ner as party systems (see table 1), i.e. in terms of fragmentation, institutionalization, and 
polarization. We thus term the number of factions, their relative size, and the vertical fac-
tional penetration of a party ‘factional fragmentation’. The respective degree of institution-
alization of factions is based not only their durability and cohesion but more importantly on 
their organizational structure, ranging from tendencies to highly organized factions (see 
above). The degree of polarization between faction in a party concerns both the ideological 
distance between the relevant factions and the intensity of ideological conflict. Connected to 
this are also the dynamics of factional conflict. A moderate conflict culture leads to centripe-
tal competition, possibly in the institutionalized form of consociational parties (Bogaards 
2003), while centrifugal factionalism can lead in extreme cases to a party’s paralysis or disin-
tegration. 
Beyond the degree of fragmentation, institutionalization, and polarization we have to ad-
dress another important characteristic of factions, viz. the central reason why factions exist: 
their raison d’être, their main functions. 
 
 
4. Functions of Intra-Party Factions 
With regard to the function of intra-party factions, many analysts have focused on the aspect 
of power struggles and the distribution of ‘booty’ (spoils faction, power faction). Factions can 
help to advance the intra-party and governmental careers of their members and leaders. 
While the attainment of positions and the allocation of posts can be termed the ‘classical 
functions’ of factions, there are also other (ideal-typical) functions. For example Sartori, tak-
ing his cue from David Hume, differentiates between interest- and principle-based functions 
(‘factions from interest’ and ‘factions from principle’, cf. Satori 1976: 8-9, 76).  
Thus not only material gain and the allocation of posts can be at the center of factional ac-
tivities. Factions can also serve to articulate and mediate particular or sectional interests (e.g. 
those of a religious, ethnic, social or vocational group) and/or can be aimed at influencing 
the party’s strategy or promoting certain values. The representation of specific interests, on 
the one hand, and the articulation of politico-ideological goals or normative issues, on the 
other hand, can thus be discerned as two further ideal-typical functions of factions. Beyond 
these basic functions, factions can also help to satisfy emotional and social needs of their 
members by means of reciprocal support and respect, intensive contacts, and by providing a 
sense of belonging. Finally, factions can be used for the exchange of information among 
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members and, more generally, can serve management and co-ordination purposes (espe-
cially within loosely coupled parties).  
In summing up it can be noted that the functions of factions are closely related to the pre-
vailing type of intra-party conflicts, i.e. whether they are about power and careers, policy 
issues and ideologies, or different sectional interests. Also, intra-party conflicts can follow 
cyclical patterns, e.g. when it comes to generational change within parties or ‘eternal’ ques-
tions such as the role of the state in the economy (cf. Hine 1982; Graham 1993: 154-157).  
 
 
5. Consequences of Factionalism: Intra-Party Groups as Independent Variable  
Generally, factionalism tend to be regarded as a phenomenon belonging to the ‘pathologies 
of politics’ (Friedrich 1972).9 This certainly reflects the views of party leaders and officials for 
whom the existence of factions poses an open challenge to party management.10 Indeed, fac-
tions can undermine the cohesion and the effectiveness of political parties. Clear-cut dissent 
within a party and ensuing repression can take parties to the verge of disintegration and 
beyond.11  
Factionalism can also lead to intra-party decisions on personnel that are not based on merit 
and ability of the people involved but on their factional affiliation. Faction-based dissent can 
damage a party’s ability to recruit new members, to fight effective campaigns, and to enter 
coalitions. Faction-based intra-party conflict can also lead to blurry and contradictory posi-
tions of a party and thus render voters’ decisions more difficult. Factionalism can impede or 
block intra-party discussions and issue-oriented debates can be drawn into the vortex of 
inter-factional power struggles. In some cases, factionalism can even be (made) responsible 
for corruption within a political party or even within the political system at large. In sum, 
intra-party factions can damage or weaken the moral authority and integrity of individual 
parties or the whole party system. Factionalism can destabilize the party system and it can 
lead to growing cynicism on the part of voters. 
                                                     
9  Accordingly the term faction is often used not only in analytical but also in pejorative terms (Sar-
tori 1976: 72-73; Beller and Belloni 1978: 445-446).  
10  There have been different ways to deal with intra-party factions which reflect, inter alia, their par-
ticular functions and their autonomy plus the political context in which they are embedded. Reac-
tions have ranged from violent suppression as in the case of Stalin’s Soviet Communist Party, si-
lent acceptance as in the case of the former Italian Communist Party to formal acknowledgment in 
party statutes as in the cases of the Brazilian Labor Party (Samuels 2004: 13) or the Polish Democ-
ratic Union (Waller and Gillespie 1995: 1). 
11  See for example the case of the Spanish UCD (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
Köllner/Basedau: Factionalism in Political Parties 14 
On the other hand (or in other cases), factions can serve as a transmission belt for bargaining 
processes, conflict resolution and consensus building within parties. The formation and fur-
ther development of factions can also have participation-widening and mobilizing effects for 
party members and supporters – especially, but not only, when it comes to internal elec-
tions. The existence of different power groups within a party can contribute to linking dif-
ferent social groups to the party and thus to strengthening the inclusionary character of the 
party. Moreover, it is even thinkable that factions stabilize a party’s leadership. This can be 
the case when a) factions serve as ‘early warning systems’ on latent conflicts and when b) 
the institutionalization of factions makes intra-party opposition more calculable.  
In general terms, factions can also promote the unity of a party by means of articulating and 
channeling different (group) interests within the party. It is important in this respect, of 
course, that the basic aims of the party are not put into question. Especially within dominant 
parties, factionalism can help to engender necessary competition between ideas and per-
sons.12 The existence of differently oriented factions inside a party can also work in a moder-
ating manner if radical and extremist positions are already countered within a party. Fac-
tions in political parties that act in an integrative manner can help to stabilize the party sys-
tem per se.  
Against the background of such possible negative and positive consequences or effects, fac-
tionalism in political parties can be an ambivalent phenomenon. Positive and negative con-
sequence might be interrelated and can at least occur at the same time. To give just one ex-
ample: factionalism can lead to a broader representation of social groups in a party (and 
thus possibly to better election results), but can also diminish the ability of the very same 
party to govern effectively.13 Moreover, factionalism in a party can develop from an advan-
tage into a disadvantage (and vice versa). As Sferza (2002: 171) has argued in this context: 
“[f]actionalism [...] is a double-edged format: while it can be extremely conducive to re-
newal, it can also be dysfunctional and a source of sclerosis”. 
With regard to the relationship between factions and the formal structures of a political 
party, it is not possible to assume a priori a complementary or a clear-cut conflictive relation-
ship. In general terms, we can speak of a complementary relationship when informal institu-
tions such as factions support the formal structures or are at least in accordance with their 
spirit. For example, factional structures and processes can be used to circumvent the rigidi-
ties of the party’s formal structures. The use of informal structures can in such cases help to 
                                                     
12  See on this Zariski (1978: 27-28), Müller-Rommel (1982: 22-24) and the more recent literature on 
factions in dominant parties (e.g. Bettcher 2005 on the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP, Bogaards 
2003 on the South African ANC). 
13  On the consequences of factionalism in parties see e.g. Raschke (1977: 226-235), Beller and Belloni 
(1978: 439-442), Müller-Rommel (1982: 37-39), Sferza (2002: passim), and Reiter (2004: 252). 
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reduce transaction costs. Intra-party factions can also support the formal party structure by 
making the access of various groups to the party easier, thus securing or increasing a party’s 
representational ability and responsiveness. Factions can even promote the legitimacy of the 
formal party framework if they help to integrate ‘traditional’, shared values into the formal 
framework, thus helping to secure support for formal, somewhat abstract party organiza-
tion. 
 
Table 2: Possible consequences of factionalism 
Possible consequences Relevant characteristics Hypotheses (examples) 
Functionality of the party
• Organizational structure 
• Social and ideological basis 
• Function within the politi-
cal/party system: governing 
or opposition party 
• Moderate institutionalized faction-
alism eases intra-party conflicts 
and increases cohesion 
• Centrifugal or polarized factional-
ism paralyses individual parties 
with regard to core functions (le-
gitimacy and efficiency) 
Functionality of the party 
system 
• Fragmentation 
• Polarization 
• Institutionalization 
• Centrifugal factionalism increases 
both fragmentation and polariza-
tion, but weakens institutionaliza-
tion of the party system and thus 
core functions of parties (legiti-
macy and efficiency weakened) 
Functionality of the 
overall political system 
or regime  
• Balance of power in parlia-
ment 
• General institutional 
framework: presidential and 
federal elements 
• Position of the party af-
fected by factionalism 
within the parliamentary 
and governmental system 
• Centrifugal factionalism promotes 
unstable majorities  
• Centrifugal factionalism in opposi-
tion parties increases power of the 
government 
• Polarized factionalism lowers re-
spect for parties 
 
The possible consequences of factionalism are not restricted to individual parties (cf. table 2). 
As mentioned above, factionalism can induce the fragmentation of parties and whole party 
systems, thus diminishing the ability of parties to act and govern. In the final analysis, the 
efficiency and legitimacy of political system can get severely damaged and even the surviv-
ability of young democracies is at stake. Generally speaking, a conflictive relationship exists 
between formal and informal structures of a political setting when informal structures ‘colo-
nize’ and undermine the formal framework. This is the case when informal structures con-
tradict the spirit of formal elements or when the formal framework is used only as a ‘host’ 
for parasitic activities and processes of an informal nature. A conflictive relationship does, 
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however, not exist when the informal structures are clearly subordinated to their formal 
counterparts.14 
Whether factionalism acts as a positive or negative factor in party politics depends on the 
particular functions of the relevant factions, the context they are embedded in, plus the deci-
sions and strategic options of the party’s leadership (cf. Pridham 1995: 23). While the litera-
ture has tended to highlight negative consequences of factionalism, questions regarding the 
specific effects of factionalism and its relationship with formal elements in the parties con-
cerned have to be answered in an unbiased manner on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
6. Explanations of Factionalism: Intra-Party Groups as Dependent Variable  
Studies on factionalism in political parties have discussed a number of different factors 
which are said to promote or aid the establishment and development of factions. Numerous 
variables both inside and outside the parties and the party system have been pointed to. 
However, there is so far no consensus on which factors should be regarded as decisive. Al-
ready Key concluded that in most cases he had analyzed, a combination of factors influ-
enced the development and traits of the factions concerned. We will divide these factors into 
three categories: 
a) general socio-economic and political dynamics and structures, 
b) formal state institutions such as electoral systems and the structure of the state, 
c) the characteristics of the party system and parties, including the historical conditions 
of party formation.  
 
General Social and Political Dynamics and Structures 
The socio-cultural environment in which organizations exist affects them through various 
channels and thus it also affects the specifics of factionalism within parties. In societies 
which are marked by strong clientelistic links or by pronounced cleavages, we are more 
likely to witness factionalist tendencies within parties. On the other hand, there seems to be 
hardly a link between the socio-economic background of politicians and their membership 
in factions.15 It seems however possible that a low level of development and a related 
heightened importance of access to resources worsens distributive fights within parties and 
                                                     
14  On the relationship between formal and informal institutions see more generally Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004), Köllner (2005: chapter 2). 
15  Cf. Zariski (1960: 46-50; 1978: 29-31), Sartori (1976: 104), Beller and Belloni (1978: 430-432), and 
Hine (1982: 46-47). 
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thus fosters factionalist tendencies. Even though this hypothesis has so far not really been 
tested, it seems plausible in countries such as India or Malawi.16 The link between the social 
environment and factionalism seems to be of particular relevance where a pronounced per-
sonalized political culture exists.  
On an altogether different level, we would expect specific conflictive political issues to affect 
the formation of factions. Here we differentiate between power-related and ideological con-
flicts: Struggles about succession at the helm of party mark a high time of personalized fac-
tion formation. Parties which are based on certain fundamental convictions, ideologies or 
worldviews (Weltanschauungsparteien) often react to new political ideas by factional position-
ing of groups within the relevant parties. For example, the advent of neo-liberalism fostered 
divisions within the two big British parties (Detterbeck 2006). 
 
Formal Institutions 
With regard to the formal institutional framework, the state’s structure, the governmental 
system, stipulations in the constitution and laws governing parties, and the (national) elec-
toral system have often been discussed as factors determining, or at least influencing, fac-
tionalism in political parties. 
Formal characteristics of the state structure and the governmental system create diverging incen-
tive structures for the establishment of factions: Where federal or decentralized state struc-
tures are connected with a significant amount of resource distribution, as in India or Ger-
many, they can promote the formation and persistence of regionally rooted factions. Direct 
elections of state presidents endowed with strong executive competences carry a particular 
personalistic element into political conflicts. Such elections can heighten intra-party differ-
ences when supporters rally around auspicious candidates in the nomination phase.  
Legal regulations governing parties and the parliament exert multitudinous effects. Regulations 
which prohibit parliamentarians from party switching (‘floor crossing’, ‘cambio de camisas’) 
while keeping their seat, are often intended to prevent party splits. Under such circum-
stances, intra-party dissent can find an outlet in faction formation. State subsidies for parties, 
on the other hand, have a contra-factional effect if the party leadership controls these funds 
(see also below). Finally, restrictions on the establishment of parties can affect the proclivity 
for faction formation. Because parties based on ethnicity, region or religion based are pro-
hibited in many sub-Saharan African countries, relevant groups have to organize in different 
kind of parties. This is possibly one reason why ethnic congress parties and not mono-ethnic 
parties are the rule in sub-Saharan Africa (Erdmann 2002). In a related vein, the prohibition 
                                                     
16  See the relevant country studies in Köllner et al. (2006). 
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of extremist parties may lead to the establishment of relevant party wings within large 
catch-all parties.  
The national electoral system determines how seats and thus posts get allocated. It is therefore 
also relevant to intra-party conflicts. It has been argued that proportional electoral systems 
provide an institutional framework amenable to faction formation and development. In the 
case of closed candidate lists, intra-party groups can become active ahead of elections in 
order to secure auspicious slots for their candidates. One the other hand, factions can also 
arise where majoritarian electoral systems are in place. It can be argued that majoritarian 
systems or high vote thresholds foster the concentration of political forces and thus also fac-
tionalism. Also the single non-transferable vote system is said to provide incentives for fac-
tionalism.17 A special case is presented by the Uruguayan electoral system. The formation 
and persistence of factions got an extra boost here because intra-party groups can present 
their own lists (so-called sublemas) under the country’s electoral system (cf. Morgenstern 
2001). 
 
Party System and Parties 
The general characteristics of a party system can also affect the formation of factions. Both a 
high degree of polarization between parties and a low number of competing parties in a 
given party system have been said to increase the available room for intra-party conflict 
about ideological issues. The second claim has however been questioned a number of times. 
It also runs counter to cases of two-party systems in which the severe competition for votes 
in fact forces moderation upon parties. Moreover, in multi-party systems the issue of coali-
tions and election pacts can also trigger intra-party conflicts and related factional activities. 
Does at least the hypothesis about the link between a high degree of polarization in a party 
system and ideology-based factionalism yield more explanatory power? Unfortunately, in a 
number of case studies the hypothesis did not jell with empirical reality, signaling that the 
explanatory power of this variable is (at best) not universal.18  
It has also been argued that the strength of parties influences factionalism. As a number of 
case studies have shown, factionalism flourishes extremely well in dominant parties. Such 
parties are a) in charge of executive power for a long time (= potential for issue-based con-
flicts among factions), b) control the distribution of power resources (potential for patron-
                                                     
17  On the consequences of various electoral systems on factionalism see Key (1984: chapter 19), 
Zariski (1960: 37-41, 1978: 24-26), Sartori (1976: 93, 98-100), Raschke (1977: 147-150, 178-180), Beller 
and Belloni (1978: 432-434, 437), Hine (1982: 42-46), Müller-Rommel (1982: 24-25), and Grofman 
(1999). 
18  For overviews see Zariski (1960: 41-43), Sartori (1976: 102), Raschke (1977: 173-178), and Müller-
Rommel (1982: 20-22). 
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age-based factionalism), and c) usually represent a broad range of socio-economic groups 
(potential for factional representation of specific interests). It has been argued in this context 
that factions in dominant parties are more unlikely to break away from these parties than 
others (as factions would lose their access to power resources). Much-cited historical exam-
ples in this context include the former Italian DC, the Japanese LDP, and the Indian Con-
gress Party. It also seems that dominant founding parties in new democracies are often af-
fected by a heavy dose of factionalism.19  
On a different level, it can be suggested that highly institutionalized party systems tend to 
host political parties that have equally institutionalized internal structures. As signaled by 
the case of the Japanese LDP with its rather durable and complex factions, however, such 
institutionalized party structures may not always be of a formal kind. Finally, it can be sub-
mitted that the need for cohesion is higher in the case of governing parties which have to 
contain intra-party conflict in order to be able to govern effectively. 
Not only in the case of governing parties, strong centripetal tendencies can better be avoided 
when the channels of party finance are controlled by the party leadership. The centralization of 
party finance tends to work against the formation or reduces at least their ability to survive. 
Conversely, the decentralization of party finance renders the establishment and further de-
velopment of factions easier. This should hold in particular true of personalized and spoils-
based factions.20  
Also, the organizational structure of parties is said to have numerous potential effects. It has 
been postulated that simply-structured elite parties exhibit a higher degree of factionalism 
than, for example, mass parties with a vast network of local branches. It has also been ar-
gued that centralized parties are more likely to have factions at the central party level 
(Zariski 1960: 43-45; Beller and Belloni 1978: 436-437; Müller-Rommel 1982: 16-20). Empirical 
studies have however repeatedly put the universal character of such causalities into ques-
tion (see e.g. Zariski 1978: 23-24). Undisturbed by this, Carty (2004: 15-16) has recently ad-
vanced a new organization-based explanation of factionalism. He argues that factions in 
political parties can be related to the loose coupling of these parties, in other words their 
stratarchy. According to Carty, factions function in such organizational contexts as instru-
ments to coordinate relatively autonomous intra-party units. Caution is however required 
with regard to claims about the connections between factional and overall party structures. 
First, there is always a danger of tautological or functionalist explanations. And secondly it 
                                                     
19  On this point see Zariski (1978: 27-28), Müller-Rommel (1982: 22-24), and Pridham (1995: 10-11). 
20  For a relevant discussion of the Italian and Japanese cases see Sartori (1976: 93-95). The connec-
tions between the channels of party finance and the internal organization of political parties have 
not yet been well analysed. For an interesting exception see Mulé (1998). 
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is often unclear whether factionalism results from a particular way of organizing a party or 
whether the causality runs the other way. In sum it can be suggested that organizational 
structures of parties offer the weakest starting point for general explanations.  
The amount of support a party can claim is not the only relevant thing when it comes to the 
social linkages of parties. Attention has to be paid to the composition and characteristics of 
support groups, i.e. their social and ideological basis, their durability and heterogeneity. For 
example where ethnicity plays a role in society, multi-ethnic congress parties should be 
more prone to factionalism than mono-ethnic parties. Based more on empirical observation 
than theory is the hypothesis that left-wing and especially extreme leftist tend – maybe as a 
reflection of some kind of ‘vanity of the least difference’ – towards centrifugal factionalism. 
Similar to national electoral systems, (s)election procedures within parties also influence fac-
tionalism in political parties. In particular primaries are said to foster intra-party factions. In 
studies on factionalism in the Republican and Democratic parties of the US, the results of 
primaries have been used to measure factional strengths (cf. Carty 2004). Also, the option of 
minority votes increases the power of intra-party groups, as for example in the case of the 
German Greens where decisions affecting the course of the party have to be supported by 
two thirds of delegates at party congresses. Authoritarian leadership sometimes also leaves 
renegades no other choice than to band together. On the other hand, in some cases factional-
ism has been suppressed by means of strict control by the party leadership.  
So far we have concentrated on presenting possible factors affecting the emergence and de-
velopment of factionalism in a systematic if somewhat static manner. However, we also 
have to be mindful of the historical conditions, critical junctures, and dynamics of party formation 
and development. In this respect, the literature on party organization has highlighted the con-
ditions of a party’s genesis (inter alia the form of territorial diffusion, the existence of charis-
matic leaders and external sponsors – e.g. labor unions – and existing collective identities in 
the case of party mergers) as important factors which can influence the formation and char-
acter of factions (see especially Panebianco 1988: chapter 4). Finally, research has shown that 
within a specific historical context the above mentioned explanatory factors for factionalism 
can act in conjunction with other factors. Thus contingencies have to be taken into account. 
We must also note that the vast majority of research in factionalism has focused on estab-
lished democracies. It should not be overlooked, however, that in new democracies the in-
stability of the party system and the political system as a whole can promote factionalism. 
Since parties are not yet settled, factional affiliations and alliances can be of greater impor-
tance to politicians than party loyalties (Magone 1995: 92, 99). Such loyalties can evolve on 
the basis of shared experiences and identities. But this development should and cannot be 
taken for granted, especially if parties continue to be controlled by individual leaders.  
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Table 3: Possible causes of factionalism in political parties 
Possible causes and 
context variables 
Relevant characteristics Hypotheses (examples) 
a) General social and political structures and dynamics 
Socio-cultural struc-
tures and dynamics 
• Cleavage structure 
• Prevalence of clientelism 
• Socio-economic level and dy-
namics 
• Heavily segmented, clientelistic 
and personalized cultures tend to 
factionalism 
• Low level of development in-
creases the importance of power 
struggles and thus promotes fac-
tionalism  
General political struc-
tures and dynamics 
• Political culture (elites and 
population) 
• Specific controversial political 
issues and crucial decisions 
(power, ideology) 
• Successions and leadership 
(s)elections promote the formation 
of factions 
• New politically relevant ideas (e.g. 
neo-liberalism) promote the for-
mation of factions 
b) Formal institutions 
State structure and 
governmental system 
• Federal vs. decentralized vs. 
unitary 
• Presidential vs. semi-
presidential vs. parliamentary 
systems 
• Federal structures combined with 
significant resource distribution 
aids factionalism 
• Presidential system promotes dis-
tributive factionalism 
Regulations in consti-
tutions and party laws 
• ‘Floor crossing’ 
• Public party funding 
• Register restrictions for parties
• Prohibition of floor crossing stimu-
lates factionalism  
• Party subsidies controlled by the 
party leadership weakens faction-
alism 
• Prohibition of ethnic or extremist 
parties aids factionalism 
National electoral sys-
tem (parliament) 
• Principle of representation 
(proportional vs. majoritarian)
• List forms, voting system  
• District magnitude 
• Thresholds of representation 
• Closed lists promote factionalism 
• Preferential voting in small dis-
tricts (with few MPs) and SNTV 
foster factionalism 
c) Party system and party 
Party system 
• Fragmentation 
• Polarization 
• Institutionalization 
• Position of party in party sys-
tem (opposition vs. govern-
ment) 
• Dominant parties tend to factional-
ism (possible functional equivalent 
of intra-party competition) 
Organizational  
structures of party  
• Size/strength of party 
• Leadership structure 
• Channels of party finance 
(both informal and formal) 
• Elite parties tend more strongly to 
factionalism than mass or catch-all 
parties 
• Centralized party finance con-
strains factions 
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Possible causes and 
context variables Relevant characteristics Hypotheses (examples) 
Social linkages of  
parties 
• Social and ideological basis 
(type, durability, and hetero-
geneity of support groups) 
• Factions are particularly likely 
where heterogeneous social and 
ideological supporters exist 
• Left-wing and parties of the ex-
treme left tend heavily to factional-
ism  
Intra-party decision-
making and (s)election 
processes 
• Degree of effective intra-party 
democracy 
• Intra-party electoral system  
• Authoritarian leadership style 
stimulates centrifugal factionalism 
• Primaries foster factionalism 
Specific historical con-
ditions of party genesis 
• Conditions of party genesis 
(e.g. party merger)  
• Young democracies 
• Instability of party system in tran-
sitional periods aids factionalism 
 
Sometimes consequences of factionalism can also turn into causes. For example re-
garding the Uruguayan case, Morgenstern (2001: 239) has argued that in 1910 the 
already heavily factionalized parties introduced a national electoral system in order 
to maintain a two-party system. According to Morgenstern, this particular electoral 
system led to the further institutionalization and disciplining of the factions. The 
ambiguity of factional phenomena with regard to their status as dependent or inde-
pendent variables has important implications for the research design. The politics of 
intra-party groups are a dynamic and complex affair. Scholars have to be aware of 
the fact that the particular period under investigation can determine whether phe-
nomena will be causes or consequences. In many cases it will be useful to differenti-
ate between several periods of factionalism (e.g. Detterbeck 2006). 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
Factionalism can play a substantial role in terms of determining or at least influencing how 
political parties perform their society and state-oriented tasks which are vital for the func-
tioning of democratic systems. Factionalism can affect the stability and institutionalization of 
parties and party systems. In the final analysis, factionalism can impact on the efficiency and 
legitimacy of political parties and political systems as a whole. This is not to say that faction-
alism is of crucial importance to how all parties and political systems operate. But as a sub-
stantial number of case studies indicate, factionalism can – for better or worse – make a dif-
ference. We thus deplore the fact that the study of factionalism has so far only received scant 
attention in the comparative literature on political parties. As this article shows, there is no 
dearth of conceptual approaches and hypotheses which can readily be used to advance the 
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systematic analysis of factionalism in political parties. The comparative study of intra-party 
groups require systematic descriptions of their characteristics as well as careful and com-
prehensive conceptualization of their possible consequences and causes. We hope that the 
analytic framework developed in this article will help to stimulate a more comparatively 
oriented and nuanced study of factionalism.  
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